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Motor Carrier Act of 1980: Toward
Compensating Trucking Companies for the
Loss of the Monopolistic Value of Their
Operating Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
The Motor Carrier Act of 19351 initiated federal regulation of
motor carriers2 engaged in interstate or foreign operation on public
highways and vested those regulatory powers in the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission).- The Act required
carriers to acquire operating rights from the ICC before beginning
operations.' The ICC automatically issued operating authority to
carriers in bona fide operation on June 1, 1935, over the route or
routes or within the territory for which they applied, without re-
quiring any further proof of eligibility.5 The reluctance of the
Commission to grant new authority, however, so curtailed competi-
tion in the trucking industry that holders of operating rights were
assured a quasi-monopoly in their authorized territories.6
Subsequent amendments to the Act permitted transfers of
1. Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (codified with amendments in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11916) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
2. Id., § 203(a)(16), 49 Stat. at 545, in which the term "motor carrier" was defined as
both a common carrier by motor vehicle and a contract carrier by motor vehicle.
3. Id. § 202(b), 49 Stat. 543.
4. Section 209(a) required contract carriers to acquire a permit before beginning oper-
ations. A contract carrier is "any person... which, under special and individual contracts
or agreeinents, and whether directly or by a lease or any other arrangement, transports pas-
sengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle for compensation."
Id. § 203(a)(15), 49 Stat. 544-45.
Section 206(a) required a common carrier to obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity before beginning operations. A common carrier is "any person who or which
undertakes whether directly or by a lease or any other arrangement to transport passengers
or property ... for the general public in interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle
for compensation . . . . "Id. § 203(a)(14), 49 Stat. 544.
Section 203(b) exempted some motor carriers from the requirement of certification.
Those exempted were farm trucks, school buses, taxicabs, hotel buses, newspaper distribu-
tors, and vehicles carrying agricultural commodities, fish, and livestock.
5. Id. §§ 206(a), 209(a), 49 Stat. 551-53.
6. Anderson, Jerman & Constantin, Railroad versus Motor Carrier Viewpoints on
Regulatory Issues, 45 ICC PRAc. J. 294, 295 (1978); Hayden, Teamsters, Truckers and the
ICC: A Political and Economic Analysis of Motor Carrier Deregulation, 17 HARv. J. LEGIS.




rights from one carrier to another," and an active market devel-
oped for the purchase, sale, and lease of existing rights.8 The oper-
ating rights became valuable assets, and carriers often used them
as collateral to finance capital investments and expansions.9 In
January of 1980, the regulated industry claimed to hold rights val-
ued between three and six billion dollars. 10
On July 1, President Carter signed the Motor Carrier Act of
1980,1" which significantly deregulated the trucking industry. Con-
gress had designed the legislation to stimulate competition among
motor carriers by lifting ICC restrictions on the issuance of operat-
ing authority. 2 Trucking companies holding operating rights prior
to the new Act maintain that those rights are now worthless.' s The
House Committee on Public Works and Transportation expressed
its intention to monitor the effect of the 1980 Act on the value of
operating rights held by trucking companies and, if the rights are
devalued, to compensate those companies for their losses.1'
The Financial Accounting Standards Board mandated that,
for accounting purposes, the affected companies immediately
charge off against income the unamortized costs of the operating
rights.' 5 Several companies also deducted the value of the rights as
losses for income tax purposes.'8 The Wall Street Journal reported
that "[t]he big motor freight hauling concerns are gearing for a
battle with the Internal Revenue Service."'" The issue is whether
present tax law will allow a motor carrier, in computing taxable
7. 49 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1976); 49 C.F.R. § 1132 (1979).
8. Hayden, supra note 6, at 134; Trucking Concerns Face Battle with IRS on Writing
Off Their Operating Rights, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1980, at 8, col. 3.
9. Anderson, Jerman & Constantin, supra note 6, at 303.
10. Hayden, supra note 6, at 133-34; Moore, supra note 6, at 343.
11. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11914 (West Supp. 1980).
12. H.R. REP. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4109, 4111.
13. Baker, Reality Takes the Wheel, FORBES, Oct. 27, 1980, at 133; Wall St. J., supra
note 8.
14. H.R. REP. No. 1069, supra note 12, at 4109, 4119.
15. 4 AICPA PROESSIONAL STANDARDS (AccOUNTING) (CCH) AC §§ 6071.03-.25 (1980)
(discussing FASB Statement No. 44); Miller, Analysis and Explanation of FASB Statement
44 Accounting for Intangible Assets of Motor Carriers, 1 MILLER'S COMPREHENsIvE GAAP
GUIDE UPDATE (1980). The statement requires separation of interstate operating rights from
other intangible assets and a charge to income of the unamortized costs as an extraordinary
item on financial statements for fiscal periods ending after December 15, 1980. AICPA PRO-
FESSIONAL STANDARDS (AccouNrINo) (CCH) AC at §§ 6071.03-.08.
16. The Tennessean, Oct. 22, 1980, at 21, col. 5. Other companies, however, do. not
want to write off their rights since the effect would be to alter drastically their debt-to-
equity ratio. Baker, supra note 13, at 134.
17. Wall St. J., supra note 8.
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income, to deduct from gross income the loss of the monopolistic
aspect of its operating rights. The Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue (Commissioner) and the Tax Court have disallowed such de-
ductions in similar cases.18 In the leading case 9 confronting the
identical issue of deductibility of the loss of a monopolistic right in
the area of motor carrier deregulation, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the monopolistic right was a "thing" cre-
ated by statute and that the loss was not deductible because the
taxpayer had no "vested interest in a law entitling him to insist
that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit."20
This Note examines the historical background and nature of
the operating rights acquired by the trucking companies, with em-
phasis on those rights issued to a common carrier by the ICC and
represented by a certificate of public convenience and necessity
(certificate). The Note then examines and analyzes the tax law and
the judicial response to attempts by taxpayers to deduct from
gross income the loss of a monopolistic right. Finally, the Note ex-
plores alternate theories for compensating trucking companies for
their losses and concludes with a recommendation of the most eq-
uitable method of compensation.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Motor Carrier Act Prior to 1980: Acquisition and
Nature of Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity
The 1935 Motor Carrier Act authorized the Commission to is-
sue a certificate of public convenience and necessity to a qualified
carrier
if it is found that the applicant is fit, willing and able properly to perform the
service proposed and to conform to the provisions of this part and the re-
quirements, rules and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that
the proposed service ... will be required by the present or future public
convenience and necessity.21
In Pan-American Bus Lines2 the ICC developed guidelines
for determining whether to grant a certificate to an applicant.
Competitors had protested the issuance of a certificate to Pan-
American, and the Director of the Bureau of Motor Carriers had
18. See Part I, Section B infra.
19. Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 562 (1939).
20. Id. at 814.
21. Pub. L. No. 74-255, § 207(a), 49 Stat. 551-52 (1935).
22. 1 Fed. Carr. Cas. 1 7001, at 3 (1936).
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denied Pan-American's application.2 The Commission, in revers-
ing the Director's decision, first explained that the words "conve-
nience" and "necessity" must be given separate and distinct mean-
ings,24 and that the word "necessity" should be liberally
construed 25 in deciding whether "the present or future public con-
venience and necessity" actually requires the applicant's service.2 6
Accordingly, the Commission developed the following
considerations:
whether the new operation or service will serve a useful public purpose, re-
sponsive to a public demand or need; whether this purpose can and will be
served as well by existing lines or carriers; and whether it can be served by
applicant with a new operation or service proposed without endangering or
impairing the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest.27
In applying these guidelines to Pan American's application,
the Commission noted that the Motor Carrier Act did not pro-
scribe competition within reasonable bounds and that, in the area
in which Pan-American intended to operate, competition might
serve a useful public purpose.2 8 The Commission also considered
the fact that Pan-American's proposed route was not the principal
route of the protestants and that the protestants had demon-
strated no evidence of harm.2
Although the Commission granted operating authority to Pan-
American Bus Lines, the guidelines developed in that case proved
to be quite restrictive in subsequent years.3 0 The applicant bore
the burden of proof of eligibility for a certificate, 1 and if any ex-
isting carrier protested issuance of a certificate the Commission
usually denied the application. 2 The Commission had the power
to terminate, suspend, amend, change, or revoke certificates,3 3 or to
issue temporary certificates with no guarantee that it would subse-
quently grant a permanent certificate.3 4 Certification became, in ef-
fect, a franchise that not only assured motor carriers of "a continu-
ing right to provide service and protection from competition which
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7001.05 (citing In Re Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 71 I.C.C. 784 (1922)).
25. Pan-American Bus Lines, 1 Fed. Carr. Cas. 7001.05, at 3 (1936).
26. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
27. Pan-American Bus Lines, 1 Fed. Carr. Cas. 1 7001.05, at 3 (1936).
28. Id. at 7001.08.
29. Id.
30. Hayden, supra note 6, at 126; Moore, supra note 6, at 340.
31. See text accompanying note 80 infra.
32. Wall St. J., supra note 8.
33. Pub. L. No. 74-255, § 212(a), 49 Stat. 555 (1935).
34. 49 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1976).
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can be wasteful and may provide no public service, as long as they
provide the . . . duties of a common carrier," but also improved
their ability to obtain financing.35 In assessing the impact of the
1935 Act, the Tax Court commented that federal regulation had
changed the character of the motor freight industry by establishing
higher standards of service and by eliminating those carriers who
did not choose to meet the standards.3 "
Since 1935 the statute has expressly stated that a certificate
does not "confer any proprietary or property rights in the use of
the public highways, 37 but the certificate itself has been charac-
terized as property.3 8 The acquisition of a certificate met the Su-
preme Court's definition of "capital investment,"3 9 and carriers
could therefore capitalize its cost.40 If a trucking firm acquired the
certificate directly from the ICC, the book value of the certificate
was simply the legal cost incurred in completing the application
procedures. 1 If, however, the company purchased the rights from
an existing company, the cost and the book value were much
greater.'2 The market value of existing operating rights prior to
1980 was estimated to be approximately fifteen to twenty percent
of the annual revenues generated by their authorized traffic.' 3
B. Deregulation of the Motor Carrier Industry
Initial efforts to deregulate the trucking industry were aborted
in the early seventies when Congress failed to pass deregulatory
legislation introduced by President Ford's administration." In the
35. Anderson, Jerman & Constantin, supra note 6, at 302-03.
36. East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 579 (1946).
37. Pub. L. No. 74-255, § 207(b), 49 Stat. 552 (1935).
38. See Part 1H, Section B infra.
39. La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921). The requirements of a
capital investment are "the laying out of money or money's worth and the acquisition of
something of permanent use or value in the business." Id. at 388.
40. Rev. Rul. 70-248, 1970-1 C.B. 172. See Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965); Hampton Pontiac, Inc. v. United States, 294 F. Supp.
1073 (D.S.C. 1969). See also M. MILLER, M .LLza'S COMPREHENsivE GAAP GUIDE § 21.01
(1980).
41. Moore, supra note 6, at 340.
42. Id.
43. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAws AND PROCEDURES, RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 197-224 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT];
Hayden, supra note 6, at 134. Moore states that the value of the certificates is equal to the
discounted present value of the future rents generated from having the license. Moore,
supra note 6, at 340.
44. Hayden, supra note 6, at 144 (citing H.R. RP. No. 10909, S. 292a in H.R. Doc.
3991981]
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mid-seventies, however, the opposition of certain carriers to ICC
rule changes foreshadowed the subsequent controversy over der-
egulation. The Commission had extended the boundaries of ex-
empt commercial zones and terminal areas by changing the rules
for determining those boundaries.45 Long-line carriers generally
supported this modification of trucking regulation, but short-haul
carriers strenuously opposed the change because entry of new car-
riers into their territory devalued their certificates.46 The Commis-
sion itself recognized that in many cases the new rules would "sub-
stantially diminish" the pecuniary value that short-haul carriers
attached to their operating certificates. 7
Several short-haul carriers filed petitions to challenge the
rulemaking authority of the ICC and to ask the courts to set aside
the ICC report and order that adopted the new rules.4 The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit combined and reviewed petitions
from several circuits.4 9 The carriers contended that the Commis-
sion's broadening of exempt areas was "individual in impact and
condemnatory in purpose," that the Commission in effect had re-
voked their certificates, and that each carrier affected by the
change in rules was entitled to adjudicatory proceedings.50 The
court held that the Commission was authorized by statute to im-
pose general conditions on the exercise of privileges granted by the
certificates 51 and that rulemaking rather than adjudicatory pro-
ceedings was appropriate.2 The Commission had solicited eco-
nomic data and opinions from a variety of sources in determining
whether to extend the boundaries of the commercial zones, and the
court weighed this factor heavily in affirming the Commission's re-
port and order. The court also determined that expansion of the
exempt areas would promote rather than frustrate the goals of the
No. 307, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975)).
45. Short-Haul Comm. v. United States, 572 F.2d 240 (1978) (reviewing Ex Parte No.
MC-37 (Sub. No. 26); Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 128 M.C.C. 422 (1976)). The
original Motor Carrier Act at § 203(b)(8), 49 Stat. 546 (1935), presently codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 303(b)(8) (1976), exempted carriers in commercial zones from certification by the ICC.
46. Baker & Greene, Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 10 TRANSP. L. J. 171
(1978).
47. Short-Haul Comm. v. United States, 572 F.2d 240, 248 (1978) (citing Ex Parte No.
MC-37 (Sub. No. 26), Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 128 M.C.C. 422 (1976)).
48. Id. at 241.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 243. The carriers argued that these adjudicatory proceedings must follow the
procedural formalities of 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
51. 572 F.2d at 244.




In the late 1970s, the ICC took further steps toward deregula-
tion by liberalizing entry restrictions." The Commission limited
the standing of firms to protest entry applications55 and discarded
the second and third parts of the test established in Pan-American
Bus Lines56 by requiring protesting carriers to show that granting
an applicant's request for operating authority threatened them
with more than "mere revenue loss"'57 and by dropping the require-
ment that an applicant prove that existing carriers could not per-
form the proposed service. Subsequent to these actions, a Report
of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures59 gave added support to the Carter administration's big
push toward deregulation. 0 The Report recognized recent deregu-
latory measures taken by the ICC61 but, nevertheless, charged that
obtaining operating authority from the ICC was often long and
costly, 2 that "carriers were often prohibited from using the most
direct route between two points, thus causing delays in shipment
and additional wasted fuel,"" and that the regulatory scheme in-
cluded a broad antitrust immunity."
The House Committee on Public Works and Transportation
(Committee) studied motor carrier deregulatory legislation for
53. Id. at 247-48. The National Transportation Policy is set forth in the preamble to
the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. preceding §§ 1, 301, 901 & 1001. In those provisions
it declares that the Act shall be administered "to promote safe, adequate, economical, and
efficient service"; to "foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the
several carriers"; "to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges
for transportation services,... without ... unfair or destructive competitive practices";
and "to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions."
54. Hayden, supra note 6, at 145; Kahn, Abolition of the Trucking Exemption: Pros
and Cons, 48 ANrrrRusT L.J. 555 (1979), reprinted in 47 I.C.C. Prac. J. 154 (1980).
55. Protest Standards in Motor Carrier Application Proceedings, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,277
(1978); see Hayden, supra note 6, at 146.
56. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
57. Liberty Trucking Co., 130 M.C.C. 243, 1978 FED. CARR. REP. (CCH)(CAsEs) i
36,872, aff'd and clarified, 131 M.C.C. 573, 1979 FED. CaR. REP. (CCH)(CASEs) 36,894.
See Hayden, supra note 6, at 145.
58. Ex Parte No. MC-121, Policy Statement on Motor Carrier Regulation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 60,296 (1979); see H.R. Rep. No. 1069, supra note 12, at 4121; Hayden, supra note 6, at
146,
59. REPORT, supra note 43, at 197; see Kahn, supra note 54, at 555-63.
60. Hayden, supra note 6, at 144; Remarks on Signing S. 2245 into Law, 16 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1261 (July 7, 1980).
61. REPORT, supra note 43, at 198; see Kahn, supra note 54, at 555.
62. REPORT, supra note 43, at 204-07.
63. Id. at 206-07.
64. Id. at 197.
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more than a year before the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was
passed.6 5 Deeming regulatory mechanisms of the Motor Carrier Act
"outmoded and archaic,""6 the Committee professed its aim to
have the industry better serve the public by increasing competition
and by reducing unnecessary federal regulation.6 7 The Committee
considered deregulation of the trucking industry as "one of the
most complex issues ever undertaken by this Committee."" A pri-
mary concern of the legislators was the devaluation of the operat-
ing rights of regulated carriers as a result of deregulatory legisla-
tion. 9 The Committee recommended that the Committee on Ways
and Means hold oversight hearings on the effect of deregulation
and consider appropriate tax relief legislation if the rights were, in
fact, devalued.
70
During the eighteen months preceding July 1, 1980, proregula-
tion journalists and neutral observers issued a steady stream of
gloomy forecasts concerning the effects of passage of deregulatory
legislation. 71 The writers maintained that deregulation would im-
mediately reduce to zero the value of operating rights, 2 and that,
unless the Teamsters consented to a downward adjustment of
wages in their contracts, many firms would face bankruptcy.73 De-
spite these critical attacks, and despite opposition from both labor
and management in the trucking industry, Congress passed the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980,75 and President Carter signed the Act
into law on July 1.76
65. H.R. REP. No. 1069, supra note 12, at 4109.
66. Id. at 4110. Regulated carriers comprised less than 50% of the industry in 1979.
Seventeen thousand firms with annual revenue of $41.2 billion were in operation under the
authority of the ICC. Id.
67. Id. at 4111.
68. Id. at 4109.
69. Id. at 4119.
70. Id.
71. See Anderson, Jerman & Constantin, supra note 6; Farris, The Case Against De-
regulation in Transportation, Power, and Communications, 45 ICC PRAc. J. 306 (1978);
Hayden, supra note 6; Kahn, supra note 54; Moore, supra note 6; Mosher, Trucking De-
regulation-An Idea Whose Time Has Almost Gone?, 11 NAT'L L.J. 817 (1979).
72. Hayden, supra note 6, at 138.
73. Baker & Greene, supra note 46, at 185; Farris, supra note 71, at 330; Hayden,
supra note 6, at 138-39. Hayden distinguished trucking deregulation from airline deregula-
tion .by noting that airlines are "price sensitive" and that profits increased because rate
reductions caused more passengers to fly. Id. at 138. See Teamsters Refuse to Reopen '79
Contract But May Urge Concessions by Some Locals, Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1980, at 16, col.
2.
74. Hayden, supra note 6, at 139.
75. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11914 (West Supp. 1980).
76. See Remarks on Signing S. 2245 into Law, supra note 60, at 1263. Senator Howard
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The new Act retains the requirement of certification by the
ICC before a common carrier can engage in interstate or foreign
transportation on the public highways.7 The Act authorizes the
issuance of a certificate to a person
if the Commission finds-(A) that the person is fit, willing, and able to pro-
vide the transportation to be authorized by the certificate and to comply with
this subtitle and regulations of the Commission; and (B) on the basis of evi-
dence presented by persons supporting the issuance of the certificate, that
the service proposed will serve a useful public purpose, responsive to a public
demand or need. 8
The Commission must continue to give each application indi-
vidual consideration, but the new act nullifies the guidelines of
Pan-American Bus Lines.79 The Act requires the ICC to issue op-
erating authority to any applicant unless it "finds, on the basis of
evidence presented by persons objecting to the issuance of a cer-
tificate, that the transportation to be authorized . . . is inconsis-
tent with the public convenience and necessity." 80 Thus, the bur-
den of proof of inconsistency with the public interest is shifted
from the applicant to the protestant.81 Since the intent of the legis-
lation is to enable new carriers to enter the industry and existing
carriers to expand their services,8 2 the Act explicitly forbids the
Commission from giving any consideration to the effect of issuance
of a certificate on the "diversion of revenue or traffic from an ex-
isting carrier."88
No longer does a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity grant a monopoly to its holder. New applicants for certificates
should experience little difficulty in obtaining operating authority.
Cannon, the Senate Commerce Committee Chairman, announced that passage of the bill
constituted a victory that belonged "to a unique coalition of consumers, shippers, industries,
and public interest groups" that "covered the entire political and economic spectrum," and
that "all shared the belief that less regulation and more competition are essential to the
future development of a sound transportation system." Id. at 1263. President Carter pre-
dicted that the new legislation would help control inflation, save gasoline, and provide "an
opportunity to use the free enterprise system of our country in its most effective form." Id.
at 1261-62. The President claimed that deregulation of the airline industry had made it
more competitive, more profitable, and more efficient. He said, "A year ago ... people then
said that it was impossible to pass a trucking deregulation bill because of the powerful polit-
ical forces involved and the controversial nature of this kind of legislation." Id. at 1261.
77. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10921 (West Supp. 1980).
78. Id. § 10922(b)(1) (West Supp. 1980).
79. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
80. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(b)(1) (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
81. H.R. REP. No. 1069, supra note 12, at 4111.
82. Id.
83. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1980).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Consequently, no real reason exists for buying a certificate from
another carrier, and the three to six billion dollar active market for
the purchase, sale, and lease of operating rights seems to have been
destroyed. As a result, the trucking industry seeks compensation
for the loss in value of its operating rights.
III. INCoME TAX LAW: THE Loss OF MONOPOLISTIC RIGHTS
Taxpayers have experienced the loss of valuable monopolistic
rights in a variety of different circumstances. At various times leg-
islative, judicial, or private action has destroyed these monopolistic
rights, which were created either by the government or by private
entities. Taxpayer attempts to secure compensation for their losses
vis-A-vis the income tax laws have usually resulted in litigation.
This part of the Note first analyzes the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) and the Treasury Regulations (Regulations) applicable to
losses suffered by taxpayers. The Note then examines the holdings
and the rationale of the courts and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) when taxpayers claimed losses of monopolistic rights in con-
nection with various businesses and industries.
A. The Code
Since 1913 the IRS has allowed corporations, in computing
taxable income, to deduct from gross income "all losses actually
sustained within the year and not compensated by insurance or
otherwise."" The amount deductible when the loss involves depre-
ciable property is the "adjusted basis" of that property.8 5 Losses of
depreciable property resulting from obsolescence or sudden termi-
nation of useful value of the property are deductible pursuant to
the provisions of Treasury Regulations sections 1.167(a)-8 and
1.167(a)-9.e6 Section 165(a) is applicable to losses involving nonde-
preciable and nonamortizable property.8 7 The amount of the de-
duction is the cost of the item or property. 8
In order to qualify as a capital asset,89 an item must first be
classified as "property." Courts have categorized monopolistic
84. Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § H G(b), 38 Stat. 172 (1913) (current version at I.R.C. §
165(a)) (emphasis added).
85. I.R.C. §§ 1011, 1012, 1016.
86. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-2(b), (c) (1960).
87. Tress. Reg. § 1.165-2 (1960).
88. I.R.C. §§ 165(b), 1011, 1012.
89. I.R.C. § 1221.
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rights as "things" 0 and as "expectations""1 rather than as prop-
erty. For tax purposes, however, the definition of property is more
liberal, and both the Code 2 and the cases9s indicate that the item
lost does not have to meet the technical definition of property in
order to be deductible. Generally, intangible assets are not depre-
ciable for income tax purposes unless the useful life of the asset is
ascertainable and definitely limited or unless the intangible asset
has value in the production of income for only a limited period of
time, the duration of which can be estimated with reasonable accu-
racy. 9 4 Intangible rights represented by a motor carrier's certificate
of public convenience and necessity are not amortizable 5 or depre-
ciable under the tax laws unless granted only temporarily. 6 For
tax purposes, they are probably classified as capital assets.97 Ap-
parently, then, a loss involving a certificate would be deductible
under section 165(a) in the amount of its cost.
The language of section 165(a) is broad on its face, but Trea-
sury Regulations, Revenue Rulings, and court decisions narrow its
scope. In order to be deductible under section 165(a), a loss must
be bona fide, "evidenced by closed and completed transactions,
fixed by identifiable events, and ... actually sustained during the
taxable year."98 According to judicial interpretation, the taxpayer
90. Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 813, 814 (9th Cir.
1939).
91. Parmalee Transp. Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 619, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
92. The word "property" is not used in I.R.C. § 165(a), in Tress. Reg. § 1.165-1(a)
(1969), governing the allowance of the deduction, or in Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1964), ex-
plaining the nature of the loss allowance.
93. See text accompanying notes 129-31 infra.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960). If the asset could qualify as an "organizational
expense," then the cost of the asset might be amortizable pursuant to I.R.C. § 248.
95. 4 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION § 23.124 (rev. vol. 1980), states
that the term "amortization" is normally "employed to describe the loss in value due to the
passage of time." For accounting purposes, the costs of operating rights have been amortiza-
ble since 1970. 4 AICPA PROFSSIONAL STANDARDS (AccouNNOG)(CCH) AC §§ 9499-9501
(1980); Miller, supra note 40, at 21.02.
96. Tress. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960). See Rev. Rul. 70-248, 1970-1 C.B. 172 (cost of
renewable liquor license not depreciable since its life cannot be estimated with any degree of
certainty); Rev. Rul. 67-113, 1967-1 C.B. 55 (cost of acquiring permanent certificates of pub-
lic convenience from the Civil Aeronautics Board not amortizable unless temporarily is-
sued). For analogous cases dealing with the ability to amortize intangible rights, see Hous-
ton Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 350 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Laird v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga.
1975); D.J. Campbell Co. v. United States, 370 F.2d 336 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Nachman v. Commis-
sioner, 12 T.C. 1204 (1949).
97. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
98. Tress. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1977).
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must have parted with something for tax purposes.99 A decline,
diminution, or shrinkage in value of an asset while it is still a part
of the business and is being used in the business does not consti-
tute a deductible loss.100 A deduction is allowed when the asset be-
comes completely worthless. 10 1 Regulation 1.165-1(b) mandates
that "substance and not mere form govern in determining a de-
ductible loss. ' '102
Regulation 1.165-2 limits section 165(a) by allowing for obso-
lescence deductions only in the case of nondepreciable property.10 3
"Obsolescence" includes a "loss incurred in a business or in a
transaction entered into for profit and arising from the sudden ter-
mination of the usefulness in such business or transaction of any
nondepreciable property, in a case where such business or transac-
tion is discontinued or where such property is permanently dis-
carded from use therein."10' 4
Revenue Ruling 56-600105 is also pertinent to the question of
whether the loss of the monopolistic right acquired with a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity may be deductible pursu-
ant to section 165. In that Ruling the Treasury determined that
the costs of acquiring and developing permanent air routes were
capital expenditures that could be written off only when a route
was abandoned and not merely when operations were suspended.
B. The Cases
A 1907 Supreme Court decision, Tracy v. Ginzberg,10 6 provides
an appropriate background for the examination of the common law
99. Citizens Bank v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1958); Fairmont Foundry,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1087 (1940).
100. 5 J. MERTENs, supra note 95, § 28.14; Reporter Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,
201 F.2d 743, 744 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953). See Tress. Reg. § 1.165-1(b)
(1977).
101. George Frietas Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 582 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1978)(deduc-
tion allowed when abandonment of private quota system rendered the quotas worthless);
Hobbs v. Commissioner, B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1 32,081 (1932)(deduction allowed for abandoned
oil leases); Fuller v. Commissioner, 11 B.TA 1025 (1928)(deduction allowed when bus oper-
ating rights declared void).
102. See Ungar v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1953)..
103. Prior to January 15, 1960, when the regulation was adopted, § 165 applied to
obsolescence losses of both depreciable and nondepreciable property. [1981] 2 STAND. FED.
TAx RaP. (CCH) 1535.01.
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2(a) (1960).
105. 1956-2 C.B. 171.
106. 205 U.S. 170 (1907). The case was decided before the Congress enacted the in-




relating to tax deductions for the loss of a valuable monopolistic
right. Tracy brought suit against Ginzberg, a trustee in bank-
ruptcy, to recover $3,000, the cost of a liquor license.10 7 Tracy al-
leged that Ginzberg had procured the police commissioners' can-
cellation of the license. 108 The lower court rendered judgment for
Ginzberg and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts af-
firmed the decision.10 9 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, Tracy argued that the police commissioners and the state
courts had deprived him of property without due process of law in
violation of the fourteenth amendment.110 In attempting to classify
his cancelled license as a property right, Tracy argued that "[t]he
word property is legally understood to include every class of acqui-
sitions which a man can own or have an interest in," and that "a
privilege," like a franchise, "is intangible property, and is recog-
nized and protected as property." ' While acknowledging that
Massachusetts courts had indeed recognized liquor licenses as
property rights,1 2 the Court held that Tracy had not been de-
prived of property without due process of law because "the expec-
tation called a right or property was of the board's creation and
therefore subject to the limitations which the board imposed."' "
1. The Liquor License Cases
The Prohibition Act of 19181 4 abolished state-issued liquor li-
censes and forced the IRS to confront taxpayers' claims for losses
of monopolistic rights as deductions from gross income. The IRS
and the courts began to develop a body of law governing those loss
deductions. The established custom of licensing boards in many
cities and states was to issue annual licenses only to those holding
107. Id. at 171-72.
108. Id. at 172.
109. Id. at 173.
110. Id. at 177.
111. Id. at 175.
112. Id. at 172.
113. Id. at 177. In making a determination that the state court had not deprived the
petitioner of property without due process of law, the Court defined such a deprivation as
"an arbitrary exercise of power, inconsistent with 'those settled usages and modes of pro-
ceeding existing in England before the emigration of our ancestors,"' and then held that the
state court in Tracy had not departed from those usages or modes of proceeding. Id. at 178
(quoting Den v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 17 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1855)). The
Court explained that if they had decided otherwise, "every judgment of a state court, in-
volving merely the ownership of property, could be brought here for review-a result not to
be thought of." 205 U.S. at 178.
114. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
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licenses for the previous year. " 5 Holders paid a fee each year for
the license itself, but severe limitations on the number of liquor
licenses issued and the free transferability of existing licenses in-
creased the value of the renewal rights accruing to the holder of a
license far above the annual fee. 16
Zakon v. Commissioner,'" the first liquor license case to be
reviewed by the Board of Tax Appeals (Board), involved the
purchase of a liquor license by Zakon in 1911 from another individ-
ual for $11,000. When that annual license expired, Zakon exercised
his renewal rights, obtained a license in his own name, and began a
business that he continued until 1919.118 After the enactment of
the prohibition legislation, Zakon claimed a loss of $35,000, the fair
market value of the license, under either section 214(a)(4)119 or sec-
tion 214(a)(8). 12 ° The Commissioner disallowed the deduction
under both sections.
In examining the disallowance, the Board emphasized that,
because officials routinely issue a new license to the transferee of a
license holder, "the [new] holder of such a license had an asset
which had a value entirely separate and distinct from the right to
conduct the business of a liquor dealer for the remainder of the
year for which such license was issued."12' Citing Tracy v. Ginz-
berg, the Board held that Massachusetts recognized the "intangi-
ble right which appertained to the ownership of the annual license
as a property right," and that, since his rights were rendered
worthless in 1919, Zakon was entitled to a loss for income tax pur-
poses in the amount of the cost of the license.'22 According to the
Board, the applicable code section was 214(a)(4) (current section
165).123 The court implied that if the renewal rights could not be
classified as property rights under state law, then the rights would
not be deductible. The Note will refer to this dichotomization of
the bundle of rights appertaining to a license as the "separate and
apart theory." This theory divides the bundle of rights into the
115. Zakon v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 687 (1927).
116. Id. at 688.
117. 7 B.TA. 687 (1927).
118. Id.
119. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1067 (1919)(current version at I.R.C. § 165).
120. Id. (current version at LR.C. § 167).
121. 7 B.T.A. at,689.
122. Id. at 690.
123. The Board stated that § 214(a)(8) was not the proper code section because the




value attributable to the renewal rights (monopolistic rights) and
the value attributable to the right to conduct the business.
McAvoy v. Commissioner124 illustrates clearly the Zakon di-
chotomization of the bundle of rights acquired by the purchaser of
a liquor license. In McAvoy the Board of Tax Appeals considered
Zakon controlling in deciding to allow petitioner a deduction for
the loss of saloon license renewal rights in 1919. Unlike Zakon,
however, the taxpayer in McAvoy purchased and owned only the
renewal rights for saloon licenses and not the licenses them-
selves.12 5 Prior to 1917 the McAvoy Company, a Chicago brewery,
had purchased the renewal rights of 131 saloon licenses 2 The city
then issued the licenses to saloon operators who would agree to
purchase the brewery's product.1 27 When McAvoy's renewal rights
lost all their value in 1919, the company claimed the cost of the
renewal rights as deductions from gross income under code sec-
tions 234(a)(4) and 234(a)(7) of the Revenue Act of 1918.128 The
Commissioner disallowed the loss "since the petitioner did not own
property which it lost when prohibition became effective." 12 9 This
rationale forced the Board, upon McAvoy's appeal, to consider the
question whether renewal rights absent ownership of the actual li-
cense constituted "property" for income tax purposes. The Board
concluded that "[w]hile that which petitioner lost may not con-
form to some technical definition of property, it cannot be denied
that the petitioner acquired something of value which it subse-
quently lost."113 Emphasizing the substance of the issue over the
form, the Board stated that "[p]etitioner paid substantial amounts
for these assets, and this investment was lost when prohibition be-
came effective and their [the assets'] use or value to it ceased to
exist." 311
Justice Holmes expounded upon the effects of the Prohibition
124. 10 B.T.A. 1017 (1928).
125. Id. at 1021. See Best Brewery v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1354 (1929).
126. 10 B.T.A. at 1018-19. A corporation could not legally hold a liquor license in its
own name. Id. at 1021. Therefore, each seller licensee assigned the rights to an employee of
the brewery who then, upon expiration of the license period and payment of the annual
renewal fee, reassigned the license to a saloon selected by the corporation. Id. at 1019.
127. Id. at 1021. The City of Chicago approved and, in fact, facilitated this practice of
purchasing and assigning renewal rights among those who had some interest in the liquor
business. City officials recognized that the practice would avoid the loss of fees that would
ordinarily result from the lapsing of saloon licenses. Id. at 1019.
128. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1078 (1919) (current versions at LR.C. §§ 165, 167).





Act on the liquor manufacturing industries and tax deductions of
losses incurred by breweries in two companion cases, Clarke v. Ha-
berle Crystal Springs Brewing Co.132 and Renziehausen v. Com-
missioner."'3 Federal prohibition legislation terminated the busi-
nesses of both breweries, and both claimed losses for obsolescence
of goodwill under section 234(a)(7).'" In concluding that Congress
could not have intended to compensate for such a loss by using the
words "exhaustion and goodwill, 13 5 Justice Holmes said that "[ilt
seems to us plain ... that when a business is extinguished as nox-
ious under the Constitution the owners cannot demand compensa-
tion from the Government .... "136
In a subsequent case, Gambrinus Brewery Co. v. Anderson,137
the IRS relied upon Clarke and Renziehausen for the proposition
that no deductions could be allowed for losses caused by the
Prohibiton Act. Thus, the Commissioner denied Gambrinus Brew-
ery Company's deduction for an obsolescence loss on its buildings
after prohibition terminated the company's business.13 8 The case
ultimately reached the Supreme Court, and the Court used the op-
portunity to dilute the strong language of its two earlier opinions
by limiting the cases to the denial of a deduction for the obsoles-
cence of goodwill."3 9 Accordingly, the Court allowed Gambrinus'
deduction of the tangible asset. 140
Even after Gambrinus some uncertainty existed concerning
the deductibility of losses of intangible property resulting from the
enactment of prohibition legislation. Elston Co. v. United States
14 1
involved a company's attempt to recover corporate income taxes
paid for the year of 1919. Prior to 1918 the brewery had purchased
renewal rights of 382 liquor licenses for $258,575.70, and it claimed
deductions for the loss in that amount under code sections
202(a) 42 and 234(a)(4).1 43 The Court of Claims observed that the
132. 280 U.S. 384 (1930). The Court was reviewing the judgment of an appellate court.
133. 280 U.S. 387 (1930). This case came to the Court from the Board of Tax Appeals.
134. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1078 (1919) (current version at I.R.C. § 167).
135. Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384, 386 (1930).
136. Id. Justice Holmes also asserted that "it is incredible that Congress... should
have meant to enable parties to cut down their taxes on such grounds because of an amend-
ment to the Constitution. . . . "Id. at 387.
137. 282 U.S. 638 (1931).
138. Id. at 638-39.
139. Id. at 641-42.
140. Id. at 645.
141. 21 F. Supp. 267 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
142. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1060 (1919) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 1011, 1012, 1016).
143. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1078 (1919) (current version at I.R.C. § 165).
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renewal rights of saloon licenses were income-producing assets'"
that were recognized as property by trustees in bankruptcy and by
the federal courts. 145 The Court then held that when "new legisla-
tion directly or indirectly makes the continued profitable use of
the property impossible" and that property must be prematurely
discarded from use in the business, then a loss is allowable under
section 234(a)(4).24 Again, as in McAvoy, the loss involved only
the monopolistic aspects of the licenses since the brewery did not
hold the licenses to operate the saloons.
2. The Leading Transportation Case: Consolidated Freight
In Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner147 a fed-
eral court first addressed the question of whether a deduction from
gross income may be taken for an alleged loss of a monopoly in the
field of transportation for hire. The State of Washington had be-
gun to regulate intrastate motor carriers pursuant to a 1921 statute
by issuing or withholding certificates of public convenience and ne-
cessity.148 The state automatically issued certificates to all carriers
in operation on January 15, 1921, and it immediately approved ap-
plications for operating authority in new territory where no other
company operated.14' Competitive lines later seeking authority,
however, could obtain certificates only when the existing line failed
to provide satisfactory service.'50 The effect of the legislation was
to grant monopolies to the original carriers in each territory and to
perpetuate the monopoly in successors who acquired the certifi-
cates from the original carriers.151
Consolidated Freight Lines had purchased a certificate from
another company for $84,388.98.1" In 1934 the Washington legisla-
144. Elston Co. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 267, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 273 (quoting Article 143 of Regulations 45, promulgated for the administra-
tion of the 1918 Act). The court, in granting Elston Company a refund, stated that
"[c]areful search discloses no case in which the Supreme Court or any other court... has
held that a loss claim similar to the one involved here is not deductible." Id.
147. 101 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 562 (1939).
148. Id. at 813.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 576 (1938). The cer-
tificates could be inherited, assigned, leased, sold, and mortgaged; they were taxable as per-
sonal property. Id. at 582.




ture destroyed by statute153 the exclusive characteristics of the
rights created under the 1921 act by allowing the state to issue
certificates to competing lines."" In its income tax return for the
year 1934, Consolidated Freight Lines deducted a loss in the
amount of $84,388.98, claiming that the destruction of the monop-
olistic rights rendered its certificate worthless.155 The IRS disal-
lowed the deduction and the company appealed. The Board of Tax
Appeals considered Gambrinus, Zakon, McAvoy, and Elston and
admitted that the facts of those cases were very similar to the facts
at hand. 56 The Board, however, distinguished Consolidated
Freight from the liquor license cases by emphasizing that in the
latter cases the entire businesses had been destroyed.
57
The Board refused to find that the monopolistic feature of the
certificate had a value "separate and apart" from the operation of
the business.'58 Instead, the Board described the bundle of rights
acquired by a certificate holder as a "complete enmeshing of the
monopolistic and operating aspects of the certificate."' 59 This the-
ory, referred to as the "enmeshing theory" in this Note, precluded
allowance of the deduction because the taxpayer suffered only a
diminution in the value of the certificate. The Board affirmed the
Commissioner's decision, but then curiously offered some hope to
pre-1934 certificate holders by remarking that "[a]ssuming. . .the
monopolistic features of the certificates. . . had some value apart
from the operative rights . . . the petitioner has not shown what
part of cost is attributable separately to those features," and
"[h]ence it has not established its basis for gain or loss.""' The
inconsistency of this observation with the Board's "enmeshing the-
153. Ch. 55, Extraordinary Sessions Laws of 1933, p. 138 (1934).
154. 37 B.T.A. at 578.
155. 101 F.2d at 813.
156. 37 B.T.A. at 581. The Board quoted Elston Co. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 267,
274 (Ct. Cl. 1938):
[T]he renewal rights of saloon licenses in [Zakon and McAvoy] . . .as in the instant
case, were income producing assets, subject to purchase, sale and assignment, separate
from the business itself. They were assignable assets distinct from the business. In this
respect they were in the same category with patents, contracts, and franchises.
37 B.T.A. at 582.
157. Id. The court pointed out that Elston does not "stand for the allowance of deduc-
tions in respect of licenses where the business goes on despite a change in some feature or
characteristic of the license." Id.
158. Id. at 581.
159. Id. The Board reasoned that, if the carrier did not satisfactorily serve the public,
the state could issue a certificate to another carrier and thereby destroy the monopoly. Id.
160. Id. at 582.
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ory" has led to confusion in subsequent cases.1"1
After Consolidated Freight Lines appealed, the Ninth Circuit
,gain scrutinized and then dichotomized the nature of the rights
acquired with a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Re-
jecting the Board's "enmeshing theory," the court determined that
the monopoly was not an element of the certificate, but instead
was a "thing" conferred by statute. 62 Because renewal rights for
saloon licenses also fit this unique classification as "things" con-
ferred by statute, the way was clear for the court to follow Zakon
and McAvoy. Ignoring the liquor license cases, however, the court
chose instead to follow different precedent: "No person has a
vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that it
shall remain unchanged for his benefit."' 6 s For that reason, and
because the 1934 statute left the certificate itself unchanged vis-&-
vis the "separate and apart theory," the court upheld the Board's
disallowance of the deduction without accepting its reasoning.'"
Since 1939 courts have cited Consolidated Freight as the lead-
ing case when a taxpayer claims a deduction for loss of a monopo-
listic right. The courts have not always understood the two theo-
ries of the nature of these rights, the "enmeshing theory" and the
"separate and apart theory," but application of either theory re-
sults in disallowance of a deduction for the taxpayer.
3. The Aftermath of Consolidated Freight
During World War H, as a result of the purchase of National
Candy Company's going business, Chase Candy Company acquired
valuable monopolistic rights to purchase and use government-ra-
tioned sugar and chocolate. 1 " When the government discontinued
sugar rationing, Chase Candy Company sued to recover corporate
income taxes allegedly overpaid, claiming that the amount paid for
the sugar purchase rights, $971,026 out of a total purchase price of
$425,000,000, should be deductible from gross income. 166 The com-
pany proffered three alternative theories in support of the deduc-
tion. First, it argued that the cost of the sugar purchase rights was
161. See text accompanying notes 171, 175 & 202 infra.
162. Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner 101 F.2d 813, 814 (9th Cir.
1939).
163. Id., (citing New York Cent. R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917), and Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1911)).
164. 101 F.2d at 814.
165. Chase Candy Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 521 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
166. Id. at 521-22.
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deductible under section 23(a)(1)(A) as an ordinary and necessary
business expense. 6 7 Second, the company maintained that the mo-
nopolistic rights had a separate value of $971,026 that was allowa-
ble as a loss upon property becoming worthless or abandoned
under section 23(f). s8 Last, Chase Candy argued that the cost of
the rights should be deductible as depreciation under section
23(0)(1).169 The court, however, stated flatly that the amount paid
"did not include the thing which was destroyed"170 and disallowed
the deduction.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Madden disregarded the theo-
retical form over substance analysis and, in support of the deduc-
tion, reasoned that
[i]f, in fact, one has paid for a license or franchise, whether he has paid for it
to a city or state, or to an owner of a business to which the right is appurte-
nant because of some "grandfather" provision in the applicable laws, he is
out the money, and if, by reason of a change in the laws, he loses the monop-
oly granted by the license or franchise, I see no reason why his true status
should not be recognized by the tax authorities.171
In 1945 the Supreme Court held that the Associated Press
(AP) bylaws that granted exclusive membership in the AP and the
exclusive right to AP services in a community were illegal under
the Sherman Act.1 72 Soon thereafter, Associated Press members at-
tempted to deduct losses of monopolistic rights on their income
tax returns, arguing that their memberships had become worthless.
In Reporter Publishing Co. v. Commissioner17 3 the taxpayer re-
duced the book value of its AP membership and claimed a deduc-
tion for tax purposes in the amount of the reduction. 17 4 The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit relied upon but apparently mis-
read Consolidated Freight and refused to consider the monopolis-
tic right as separate from the membership.'5 Applying the "en-
167. Id. at 522. The court rejected this argument because the amount paid was "more
analagous to a capital outlay than to an ordinary and necessary business expense." Id. at
524.
168. The court reminded the petitioner that the Consolidated Freight court had re-
jected such a line of reasoning. The court explained that the monopoly was conferred by
statute. Id. at 525.
169. Id. The court dismissed this argument without discussion.
170. Id. at 526. The court noted that "plaintiff's situation is similar to that of the
taxpayer in Consolidated Freight Lines." Id.
171. Id. (Madden, J., dissenting).
172. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
173. 201 F.2d 743 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953).
174. Id. at 744.
175. Id. at 745.
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meshing theory" of the Board in Consolidated Freight, the court
determined that the destruction of the AP monopoly resulted only
in a diminution in the value of the membership.17 Because plain-
tiff still used the AP membership to receive services, the court re-
fused to allow the deduction.
1
7
The taxpayer in New York Sun, Inc. v. Commissioner" used
a different approach in claiming its loss of the AP monopolistic
right.179 The Sun had carried the membership on its books in an
account captioned "Franchise, Circulation and Goodwill."' 80 After
the Supreme Court invalidated the monopolistic provisions of the
AP bylaws, the newspaper company contended that the franchise
consisting principally of the AP membership was a separate and
distinct intangible asset and that the full cost of the membership
was deductible as a loss for tax purposes even though the Sun con-
tinued to use the membership in its business.' 8' The Tax Court
rejected the Sun's theory and held that the loss was not
deductible.
82
If the courts had applied fully the "separate and apart theory"
and the reasoning of Consolidated Freight to these Associated
Press cases, they could have sustained the loss deductions because
a private entity and not a statute created the right of monopoly.
The AP cases were distinguishable from Consolidated Freight. Ar-
guably, the newspapers had a vested interest in their AP member-
ships. The implication of the AP cases is that whether a monopoly
is created by statute or by a private entity, no person has a vested
right in any monopoly "entitling him to insist that it shall remain
unchanged for his benefit." Because the courts applied the "en-
meshing theory," however, they never actually reached the ques-
tion of whether a taxpayer has a vested interest in the monopoly;
instead, they denied the loss deduction on the basis of "a mere
diminution in value of an asset."
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 27 T.C. 319 (1956).
179. Id. at 329. The petitioner contended that he claimed his loss not because of the
Supreme Court decision but because the AP voluntarily eliminated the initial charge for an
AP membership. Id.
180. Id. at 320.
181. Id. at 326.
182. Id. at 328-30. The court recognized that the Sun had lost valuable rights to re-
ceive payment from new members and to use the membership for purposes of obtaining
credit, but commented that the membership "did not become worthless within the intend-
ment of the statute and the regulations." Id. at 329.
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If the courts' reasoning in the Associated Press cases departed
from the theory advanced by the Ninth Circuit in Consolidated
Freight, the Court of Claims had the opportunity to set the juris-
prudence back on course in Parmalee Transportation Co. v.
United States."' Since 1853 Parmalee Transportation Company
and its predecessor in interest1 8 had held by informal arrange-
ments the exclusive privilege of providing baggage and passenger
transfer service for the eight railroads operating in Chicago. 8 The
arrangements with the railroad had a book value of
$1,322,819.05.l8s When the railroads terminated the arrangements
in 1955 and gave a competitor the exclusive right to the transfer
service, Parmalee wrote off the $1,322,819.05 and, claiming an ordi-
nary loss under section 165, sued for a refund of taxes paid.187
In opposing the deduction, the government revived the argu-
ment that the taxpayer's loss did not involve "property" for pur-
poses of the Code. Utilizing a word from Tracy v. Ginzberg with-
out citing the case, the government maintained that Parmalee had
a mere "expectancy" that railroads would continue the exclusive
arrangements.1m The court agreed that the taxpayer had an expec-
tancy in the continuation of the exclusive arrangements, but it ac-
cused the government of adopting an "unduly formalistic" view-
point and of failing "to take account of the breadth of the concept
of 'property' in tax law."18 9 Distinguishing Parmalee from Consoli-
dated Freight, the court reasoned that this "expectancy" was dif-
ferent from that created by statute, that it approached being a
property right, and that it should be considered "property" for in-
come tax purposes.1 90
183. 351 F.2d 619 (Ct. Cl. 1965). Instead, the Parmalee court cautioned in a footnote
that "[a]lthough a substantial portion of this opinion relates to the issue of whether-the
claimed logs is deductible under the tax laws, we stress that this is dicta only and will have
no collateral estoppel effect in any other forum." Id. at 621 n.1 (emphasis added).
184. After a 1934 liquidation of the Parmalee Company, the Parmalee Transportation
Company succeeded to the business and carried the excess book value over tangible assets
in an account entitled "Intangible Assets." Id. at 622.
185. Id. at 621. Parmalee had a written contract with only one of the railroads. Id.
186. Id. at 622.
187. Id. at 622-23.
188. Id. at 623. In support of this analysis, the government proffered the following
three arguments: first, unlike franchises, patents, and licenses, the arrangements were not
readily assignable; second, the exclusive arrangements could be granted only by railroads;
and last, because the taxpayer had paid nothing for the exclusive arrangements, the intangi-
ble assets were actually "good will" that cannot be deducted as a loss when it is destroyed.
Id. at 623.
189. Id. at 623.
190. Id. at 624.
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The court distinguished Parmalee from Consolidated Freight
and Chase Candy Co. by noting that, in those cases the taxpayers
had tried to assert the existence of a property right in a state-cre-
ated monopoly.191 The court observed that "[t]here can be little
doubt that no person has a vested interest in a public law which
entitles him to insist that it not be changed. ' 192 Finally, the court
noted that Consolidated Freight Lines and Chase Candy Company
had continued to operate their businesses after statutes abolished
their monopolistic rights, while Parmalee was completely excluded
from the business.1 93 The court determined that the loss was allow-
able although it was not deductible in the year 1955.194
In 1966, in Beatty v. Commissioner,195 the Tax Court consid-
ered an Arizona taxpayer's claim for a section 165 deduction of the
amount paid for a liquor license. Beatty had purchased the license
both as an investment1 6 and for the purpose of operating a liquor
business. 197 Shortly thereafter, in order to curtail speculation in li-
quor licenses, the Arizona legislature amended the liquor laws to
preclude any assignment, transfer, or sale of licenses unless the
owner transferred the entire business in a "bona fide bulk sale,"
and to authorize issuance of additional licenses.19 8 If a license re-
mained inactive for six months, it would revert to the state, which
could then issue it to someone else."9 Beatty claimed that the
amendment rendered his license worthless, and he deducted a
$25,000 loss on his 1961 income tax return."' The Commissioner
denied the deduction. On appeal Beatty argued Zakon's "separate
and apart theory, 2 0 1 but the court, influenced by the Board's deci-
191. Id. The courts deciding the AP cases did not find this factor to be significant.
192. Id. (citing New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917)). The court
qualified the statement in the following footnote: "Elston [sic] . . .would have been an
altogether different case had the Prohibition laws not been involved, but rather had the City
of Chicago issued two or three times the number of licenses-or abolished the licensing
system." (citation omitted) Id. at 624 n.3.
193. Id. at 624.
194. Id. at 629.
195. 46 T.C. 835 (1966).
196. Arizona had limited the number of licenses issued and had required the holders
of the liquor licenses to renew them annually upon payment of a renewal fee. Because this
practice enhanced the value of license renewal rights and because the rights were freely
transferable, liquor licenses were often purchased as investments. See id. at 841.
197. Id. at 836.
198. Id. at 837.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 838.
201. Beatty based his arguments on Zakon, Consolidated Freight, and four Arizona
cases. The four state cases were cited to support his contention that the liquor license em-
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sion in Consolidated Freight, rejected that theory and insisted that
the taxpayer had suffered a mere diminution in the value of his
license because he was still using the liquor license in his busi-
ness.20 2 Therefore, it affirmed the Commissioner's disallowance of
the loss.
20 3
Beatty offered one new argument that courts had not consid-
ered in other cases involving the loss of monopolistic rights. He
suggested that his case was distinguishable from Consolidated
Freight by quoting the following statement from that opinion:
"[T]here is no showing that the certificates were bought and sold
like shares of stock or bonds which are so often held by the owner
for income or appreciation without thought of his engaging in the
business."'204 Because the liquor licenses were traded like shares of
stock or bonds, Beatty argued that the language in Consolidated
Freight supported his deduction.2 5 The court quelled that argu-
ment by pointing out that Beatty was not a "pure investor. '20 6 The
court, however, did expressly leave open the question of whether
"a 'pure investor' who bought a liquor license for speculative pur-
poses might be treated differently.
'20 7
Tax law regarding deductions from gross income for the loss of
monopolistic rights has been firmly settled in the forty years since
Consolidated Freight. A court will not allow a deduction for the
loss of a monopolistic right if legislative or judicial action destroys
the monopoly and if the taxpayer retains any other use of the un-
derlying license.20 If a taxpayer holds only the monopolistic char-
acteristic of the license and the monopoly is destroyed, then a
bodied valuable property rights separate and apart from the license to do business and that
those rights could be enforced against a third party. The court noted that local law does not
control a taxpayer's right to a deduction for federal tax purposes. Id. at 839.
202. Id. Additionally, the court pointed out that the severing of the monopolistic
rights from the license itself would soon nullify the rule of "mere diminution" because every
taxpayer would separate his assets into their different purposes and write off the cost of
each element if that purpose was destroyed. Id. at 841-42 (citing Louisiana Land & Explora-
tion Co., 7 T.C. 507, 518 (1946), affld, 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947).
203. The court based its decision on the ground that there was no closed transaction.
46 T.C. at 839-40. See Tress. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1964).
204. 46 T.C. at 841 (quoting Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37
B.T.A. 576, 580-81 (1938).
205. 46 T.C. at 841.
206. Id. The court analogized Beatty's case to Reporter Publishing Co., in which "con-
tinued use [of the asset] negated any claim of worthlessness." Id. at 840.
207. Id. at 841.
208. If a private entity destroys the monopolistic right, a deduction may be allowed.
See notes 183-94 supra and accompanying text.
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court may allow the deduction of the loss. 2 09 Undoubtedly, in 1980,
both the IRS and the Tax Court would take the position that
trucking companies could not claim a section 165 deduction for the
loss of the monopolistic right acquired with a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.
IV. THEORIES FOR COMPENSATING DEREGULATED CARRIERS
A. Compensation Within Present Tax Law
A deregulated carrier could argue various theories in support
of its claim for a deduction for the loss of its operating rights. A
farfetched notion would be to donate the certificate to a qualified
charity and to deduct the contribution pursuant to section 170.210
More realistically, however, a trucking company that claims a loss
pursuant to section 165 might prevail on appeal in a circuit that
has not ruled on the issue of the deductibility of the loss of a mo-
nopolistic right, or in a district court refund suit with a jury trial,
or in a court presided over by a "Madden-type judge." ''1 Taxpay-
ers who have argued for the deductibility of the losses of monopo-
listic rights have presented various ingenious arguments in the
past. The trucking companies must now construct new theories or
alter the focus of some of the old arguments to convince a jury or a
judge that the deduction should be allowed. The "substance over
form" requirement of Regulation section 1.165-1(b) provides one
favorable option to the taxpayer. This part of the Note considers
plausible arguments that support the allowance of a section 165
deduction for trucking companies within the present income tax
law.
Under the "enmeshing theory," the taxpayer could argue that
the basic nature of a certificate of public convenience and necessity
has changed. Although the taxpayer could capitalize the cost of the
certificate at the time of acquisition, the certificate is now worth-
less as a capital asset. Accordingly, the cost should be written off
the books for all purposes, including tax purposes.
In the alternative, the taxpayer could utilize the "separate and
apart theory." As the Consolidated Freight court found, the mo-
nopolistic right is a separate "thing" conferred by statute. The leg-
209. See Ehton Co. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 267 (Ct. Cl. 1939); McAvoy v. Com-
missioner, 10 B.T.A. 1017 (1928).
210. The company would then make application to the ICC for another certificate.
211. See text accompanying note 171 supra.
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islature may change the statute at will or on "a whim. '212 The
value of this "thing" was contingent upon a continuation of the
ICC's restrictive policy in granting certificates. The Court denied
the deduction in Consolidated Freight because it found that "[n]o
person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit .... "213 That
rationale can and should be challenged. The statement originated
in a nineteenth century Supreme Court decision, Munn v.
Illinois.
1 4
In Munn petitioners operated a grain storage warehouse. The
state of Illinois enacted legislation in 1871 that required licensing
of public warehouses and set a maximum fee for the storage of
grain.21 5 In 1872 the state filed charges against Munn and Scott for
operating a public warehouse without a license and for charging a
rate higher than the statutory maximum for the storage and han-
dling of grain.21" The warehouse owners contended that, under the
common law, the owner of property is entitled to reasonable com-
pensation for its use, and that the amount of reasonable compensa-
tion is a question for the judiciary, not for the legislature.217 The
Court agreed that the judiciary must determine what is reasonable
if the legislature has not enacted statutes governing the amount of
compensation.21 "
Because the warehouse owners had established their business
before the adoption of the regulations, they claimed that the legis-
lation deprived them of property without due process of law.219
The Court then enunciated the principle that "a person has no
property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. That
is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred
than any other."220 Conceding that the government cannot take
away without due process property rights created by the common
law, the Court asserted that "the law itself may be changed at the
212. See note 221 infra and accompanying text.
213. 101 F.2d at 814 (quoting New York Cent. R. R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198
(1917). A question that arises is whether the holders of liquor licenses had a vested right in
the law that required one who operated a liquor business to be licensed.
214. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
215. Id. at 116.
216. Id. at 117-18.
217. Id. at 133-34.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 119-20.
220. Id. at 134.
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will or even at the whim of the legislature .... 1121 The Court
defined the issue as whether a state could regulate the charges for
storage of grain 22 2 and answered in the affirmative, but the Court
failed to address the question of whether the state must pay com-
pensation if the regulation deprives the owner of property. Munn
had only questioned the constitutionality of the state's regulation;
he had not claimed a fifth amendment taking of property without
just compensation.2 3 The dissenting opinion insisted that the state
could take a citizen's property only if it pays just compensation.22'
In Consolidated Freight the court essentially followed Munn
by holding that the state could regulate private industry that is
affected with a public interest.2 25 The court, however, failed to
reach the critical question posed implicitly by the taxpayer:
whether the state must compensate a citizen if the state changes a
law and the change results in the citizen's loss of property. Future
courts might be willing to answer that question in the affirmative
by determining that compensation is due the taxpayer for property
loss (a monopolistic right) resulting from the Motor Carrier Act of
1980. Such a determination could result in a section 165 deduction
from gross income in computing taxable income for the year of
1980. If a court does not allow compensation in the form of a re-
duction in taxes, a trucking company might consider a fifth
amendment taking action in district court.
B. Just Compensation for a Fifth Amendment Taking
The fifth amendment guarantees that "private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. '228 Several
days before the President signed the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
the Supreme Court, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,227 held that a de-
termination that government action constitutes a taking is, "in es-
sence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single
owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the
public interest.212 8 The modification of trucking regulation will
cost formerly regulated trucking companies, at a minimum, the
221. Id.
222. Id. at 123. See also Farris, supra note 71, at 312-18.
223. See Part IV, Section B infra.
224. 94 U.S. at 145 (Field, J., dissenting).
225. 101 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 562 (1939).
226. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
227. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
228. Id. at 260.
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amounts paid for operating rights. The question then is whether
the companies or the public at large should bear this cost. This
part of the Note first examines "takings clause" law and then ap-
plies the law to the changes effected by the 1980 Act in the value
of certificates of convenience and necessity.
1. "Taking" Law
Courts have never developed a definite formula for determin-
ing whether government action results in a taking for which the
property owner must be compensated.22 9 Justice Holmes noted in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon230 that the judgment of the legis-
lature is given the greatest weight but that any citizen who feels
that the legislature has exceeded its power may bring a taking ac-
tion.23 1 In Mahon a coal company had sold the surface of real
property for residential use while retaining mining rights, but the
Pennsylvania legislature later enacted a statute that prohibited
mining beneath houses.2 2 The taking claimant contended that the
measure was in reality "not legislation" but "robbery under the
forms of law."233 The Court determined that a property owner was
entitled to compensation when, as a result of the government ac-
tion, the extent of diminution in property value reached "a certain
magnitude. ' 23' Because this holding went beyond any case previ-
ously decided by the Court, and because the mining rights were
rendered worthless, the Court held that the passage of the statute
effectuated a compensable taking. 35 The vagueness of the "dimi-
nution in value" test developed in Mahon has prompted the Su-
preme Court to cover takings clause actions with the standard as-
surance that the Court's determination of whether a taking
requiring compensation has occurred will depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case.23
229. See generally Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
230. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
231. Id. at 413.
232. Id. at 412-13.
23a. Id. at 397 (citing Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874)).
234. 260 U.S. at 413.
235. Id. at 416. The separation in ownership of the mining rights from the balance of
the fee simple was critical to the Court's finding that a taking had occurred. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1230 (1967).
236. 260 U.S. at 413; accord, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
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In United States v. General Motors Corp.,23 7 a 1945 case in-
volving the taking of a leasehold interest, the Court identified the
critical issues in a taking claim as follows: first, whether the
"thing" claimed to have been taken by government action is appro-
priately classified as a "property interest" protectible under the
takings clause; second, whether a "taking" has actually occurred;
and third, the amount of "just compensation" if a taking of prop-
erty has indeed occurred.23 8 The Court broadly defined "property"
for purposes of the takings clause as "every sort of interest the
citizen may possess. ' 23 9 In determining whether a taking had oc-
curred, the Court focused on the extent of the former owner's dep-
rivation rather than on the government's use or destruction of the
property.240 The Court concluded that if the effects of government
action are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his
interest in the subject matter, then a taking has occurred.24 In re-
sponse to the third issue of determining "just compensation," the
Court found that, in order to put the property owner in as good a
position as if the property had not been taken, the government
must pay market value.2 42 In more recent decisions the Court has
stated that the amount of compensation depends upon "basic equi-
table principles of fairness," 243 that the amount is the "full mone-
tary equivalent, '24 4 and that "the amount. . . is for judicial rather
than legislative determination.
'3 45
The threshold question critical to this Note is whether the
"thing" claimed to have been taken by the government action is
appropriately classified as a protectible "property interest." The
Supreme Court has never expressly labeled a license or a monopo-
listic right a property right.24 Massachusetts elevated a liquor li-
cense to the status of "property,"2 47 and several states have held
123 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
237. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
238. Id. at 377-80.
239. Id. at 378. The Court rejected the definition of property as the "vulgar and un-
technical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recog-
nized by law." Id. at 377.
240. Id. at 378.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 379.
243. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973).
244. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
245. Cahill v. Cedar County, 367 F. Supp. 39, 44 (N.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd mem., 419
U.S. 806 (1974).
246. See text accompanying notes 111-13 supra.
247. Tracy v. Ginzberg, 205 U.S. 170, 172 (1907).
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that a franchise is "property" for purposes of a compensable tak-
ing.2 8 Some states, however, do not define "property" in liberal
terms. The Delaware courts maintain consistently that a "mere"
license or permit is not a property right in either the constitutional
or legal sense of the word.249 When the holder of a state-issued
certificate of public convenience and necessity brought a taking ac-
tion to recover compensation for the loss of bus routes, the court
denied the claim. 250 The court discussed the distinction between a
certificate or license that can be amended or revoked at will by a
grantor and a franchise that springs from a contract between the
sovereign power and a private citizen for valuable consideration
and then concluded that the certificate does not represent a prop-
erty right.251 The fact that the certificate was not transferable was
important to this decision2
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City258 the
Court reviewed the significant factors that have shaped the juris-
prudence of the fifth amendment takings clause: the economic im-
pact of the government action on the claimant, the character of the
government action, and the reason for the government action. The
Court observed that a finding of a taking is more probable when
the government action has greatly "interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations" of the claimant, when the government
has physically invaded the property,25' and when the action is
taken to promote a uniquely public purpose.255 The transportation
248. United States v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 147 F.2d 953 (9th Cir.
1944)(franchise to erect and maintain power line poles and wires is personal property); City
of Tucson v. El Rio Water Co., 101 Ariz. 49, 415 P.2d 872 (1966)(franchise is property for
which compensation must be paid); In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 613, 241
N.E.2d 717, 294 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1968), remittitur amended, 24 N.Y.2d 773, 247 N.E.2d 861,
300 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969), appeal after remand, 34 App. Div. 2d 930, 312 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1970) (franchise is protected both by state and federal constitutions against substantial cur-
tailment or destruction by government without payment of fair compensation). Contra, Citi-
zens Utilities Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 25 I. App. 3d 252, 322 N.E.2d 857
(1974)(termination of franchise or permit that by its terms is revocable does not deprive
owner of property that is constitutionally compensable).
249. Donovan v. Delaware Water & Air Resources Comm'n, 358 A.2d 717 (Del. 1976);
Artesian Water Co. v. State Dept. of Highways & Transp., 330 A.2d 432 (Del. 1974); Greater
Wilmington Transp. Auth. v. Kline, 285 A.2d 819 (Del. Super. 1971).
250. 285 A.2d at 823.
251. Id.
252. Id. The certificate "is personal in its character, is not transferable and does not
pass by succession." Id.
253. 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978).
254. Id. at 124.
255. Id. at 128.
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company claimed that the city's statutory restrictions on the devel-
opment of Union Station effected a fifth amendment taking requir-
ing the payment of compensation.2 5 In making the decision that a
compensable taking had not occurred, the Court applied the same
"diminution in value" test espoused in Mahon, but shifted the fo-
cus of the inquiry from the value of property taken from the owner
to the value remaining with the owner after the government ac-
tion. The Court then held that, although the restrictions promoted
a public purpose, the property owner retained a reasonable benefi-
cial use of the landmark site and that the law actually enhanced
the owner's economic position.
The holding in Andrus v. Allard258 reflects the stringency of
this new "reasonable beneficial use" test. In Allard the Court con-
sidered a government challenge to a district court's holding that
Department of Interior regulations prohibiting the commercial
transfer of certain species of birds effectuated a taking of prop-
erty.2 59 The appellees were engaged in the trade of Indian artifacts
composed partially of feathers from birds protected by the regula-
tions.26 0 The Court first reiterated the right of the government to
regulate and adjust private property rights for the public good,
"subject only to the dictates of 'justice and fairness,' ,,211 and then
applied the "reasonable beneficial use" test developed in Penn
Central to the facts of the case. In reversing the district court's
finding of a taking, the Court considered significant the fact that
the regulations compelled no surrender of the artifacts and in-
volved no physical invasion of the property.262 Because the regula-
tions restricted only one method of disposing of the artifacts, the
Court found that the restriction destroyed only one "strand" of the
bundle of property rights possessed by the artifact owners and that
the appellees retained the rights to possess and transport their
property and to donate and devise the birds.2 s In the Court's
256. Id. at 107.
257. Id. at 138.
258. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
259. Id. at 55.
260. Id. at 54.
261. Id. at 65 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)). The Court stated that resolution of the conflict between private property rights and
the public interest required not only the exercise of judgment but also the application of
logic. 444 U.S. at 65.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 66. The Court suggested that the appellees charge admission to an exhibit
of the artifacts. Id.
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opinion, "the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired
property in this case [did] not effect a taking. '264 The regulations,
however, probably did not seem so "simple" to the appellees whose
livelihood depended upon the ability to sell the artifacts. The ef-
fect of the Court's decision in Allard reinforces the appropriate-
ness of Justice Holmes' warning in Mahon that "[w]e are in danger
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public con-
dition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. '265
Assuming that operating rights are protectible "property," a
trucking company could have met the pre-Penn Central "diminu-
tion in value" test for determining whether a compensable taking
had occurred, for the entire bundle of rights acquired with a certif-
icate of convenience and necessity lost most of its value when Con-
gress enacted the 1980 legislation for the public benefit. With the
advent of the "reasonable beneficial use" test, however, trucking
companies face an uphill battle in proving that a compensable tak-
ing is the result of the new Motor Carrier Act. Favorable to the
trucking companies, however, is the Court's continuing assur-
ance 26 6 that it will decide each case upon its own particular facts
and circumstances.
2. Application of the Law
A carrier seeking compensation for a fifth amendment taking
of property may base a persuasive argument upon the recent Su-
preme Court pronouncement that the finding of a taking is essen-
tially a finding that the public, and not a private business, should
bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public inter-
est.2 67 Congress initiated regulation of the motor carrier industry in
1935 in an attempt to alleviate chaotic conditions within the public
transportation industry.268 In exchange for operating authority,
trucking companies agreed to meet standards imposed by the
ICC.2 9 The companies fulfulled their obligations, regulation was
264. Id. at 67-68.
265. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
266. See text accompanying note 236 supra.
267. See text accompanying notes 227-28 supra. This statement, in effect, seems to
echo Justice Holmes' comment in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416
(1922), that the ultimate question in a takings case is who should pay for the change result-
ing from the government action.
268. Hayden, supra note 6, at 128.
269. Pub. L. No. 74-255, § 207(a), 49 Stat. 551-52 (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. §
10922 (West Supp. 1980)); see text accompanying note 21 supra.
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successful, and in 1980 a congressional committee remarked that
the industry was "a healthy industry that has effectively competed
with other freight-hauling modes. 2 70 The nation's leaders, how-
ever, determined that deregulation of the industry was necessary
and that it would be in the public interest.271 The benefits of de-
regulation will inure to the public as did the benefits of regulation.
Therefore, the trucking companies may argue that the general
public should bear the cost of this deregulation. A court should
also consider the fact that the legislature intended for deregulated
carriers to be compensated for any loss in value of their operating
rights. '27 Although legislators suggested tax relief legislation as a
method of compensation, the House Committee on Public Works
and Transportation did not rule out just compensation for a taking
of property.2
73
In constructing legal theories to support a finding of a com-
pensable taking of a trucking company's property, courts must
again consider the nature of the bundle of rights acquired with a
certificate of public convenience and necessity. If the monopolistic
right is an asset separate and apart from the right to engage in
interstate or foreign operation on public highways, and if the mo-
nopolistic right alone is a property interest protected under the
fifth amendment, then a carrier might recover "just compensation"
for a taking under the "reasonable beneficial use" test. Just as the
mining rights were rendered worthless in Mahon,27 4 the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980 totally destroys the monopolistic right. The
right can be distinguished from revocable franchises 275 and from a
nontransferable certificate,2 7 6 which have been denied status as
compensable property.
If the monopolistic right is considered to be only one strand in
the bundle of rights acquired with the certificate (the enmeshing
theory), the trucking company must contend with the harsh rule of
270. H.R. REP. No. 1069, supra note 12, at 4110.
271. See Remarks on Signing S. 2245 into Law, supra note 60, at 1263; 125 CONG. REc.
S3075-7 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1979) (remarks of Senator Kennedy); Senators Clashing on
Trucking Bill, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 1.
272. H.R. REP. No. 1069, supra note 12, at 4109, 4119.
273. Id.
274. See text accompanying notes 230-36 supra.
275. See notes 33 & 111-13 supra. The certificate held by a motor carrier may be
revoked only if the carrier fails to comply with ICC regulations, rules, and orders. Pub. L.
No. 74-255, § 212(a), 49 Stat. 555 (1935).
276. See text accompanying notes 250-52 supra.
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Allard27 7 in order to prevail. Admittedly, the effect of deregulation
on the trucking companies is similar to the effect of the prohibitive
regulations in Allard. Like the artifact traders, the carriers lost a
valuable intangible right. Under the Allard approach, however, the
focus is on the property retained by the claimant. Prior to promul-
gation of the regulation by the Department of the Interior, the ar-
tifact traders owned tangible property, whereas the trucking com-
panies owned only intangible property rights represented by a
certificate prior to the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. After promulga-
tion of the regulation, however, the traders retained all of their
tangible property-a fact considered significant by the Allard
Court. After passage of the Motor Carrier Act, the trucking compa-
nies retained only a part of the property-the right to operate the
business. Thus, the carriers' cases may be distinguishable from Al-
lard in that respect.
Courts should also give weight to the fact that a trucking com-
pany has outstanding investment loans backed by the operating
rights. The Court's observation in Penn Central7 8 that a taking
will more likely be found when the government action has "greatly
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations" of the
claimant is favorable to carriers. Not only did the lifting of restric-
tions on the granting of operating authority interfere with invest-
ment-backed expectations of the trucking companies, but the oper-
ating rights "taken" by the government also propped up those
investments in many cases.
The carriers should emphasize the Supreme Court's assurance
that "justice and fairness '279 and "judgment . . . [and] logic"
280
govern a determination of whether a compensable taking has oc-
curred. Since courts decide cases on an ad hoc basis, some carriers
may recover in a taking action while other carriers may not be able
to establish that a taking has occurred.
C. Tax Legislation
The House Committee on Public Works and Transportation
recommended that appropriate relief for the carriers might lie in
the enactment of new tax legislation.2 81 In order to compensate
277. See text accompanying notes 258-64 supra.
278. See text accompanying notes 253-57 supra.
279. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). It has been suggested that the only test for compen-
sability should be the test of fairness. Michelman, supra note 235, at 1172.
280. 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
281. H.R. REP. No. 1069, supra note 12, at 4119.
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fully for the trucking industry's losses, the legislation would have
to authorize a credit in the amount of the cost of the operating
rights.2 2 A bill introduced in Congress on September 18, 1980, pro-
poses a deduction, to be phased in over three years, in the amount
of the greater of the "aggregate adjusted value" of the operating
rights or $50,000.283
This Note suggests that the appropriate compensation is a tax
deduction and that the proper amount of the deduction is the cost
of the operating rights, since cost is consistent with other code pro-
visions allowing deductions in the amount of the basis (cost) or
adjusted basis of the asset lost 2 ' This deduction would then
equalize treatment of trucking companies and similarly situated
taxpayers who suffer losses involving capital assets or property
used in their trade or business.
V. CONCLUSION
The general public may derive all of the benefits promised by
proponents of motor carrier deregulation,8 5 but either the legisla-
ture or the judiciary should compensate the trucking companies for
the loss in the value of their operating rights. Compensation pursu-
ant to the fifth amendment takings clause could result in a revenue
loss to the government in the amount of the market value of the
rights. Thus, the least costly form of compensation for the govern-
ment is a tax deduction from gross income in the amount of the
cost of the rights. This deduction could be made available under
the current law. The time has come for the courts to recognize the
flaw in Consolidated Freight-the decision did not reach the heart
of the issue before the court. A Supreme Court ruling would be
necessary, however, in order to effect a change in the position of
the Internal Revenue Service on the allowance of losses of monop-
olistic rights under section 165. Consequently, this Note proposes
that, in the interest of time and equity, Congress should provide
compensation immediately in the form of new legislation authoriz-
ing a special tax deduction in the amount of the cost of the asset.
Trucking companies could take the deduction in the year subse-
quent to enactment of the legislation. Unless Congress or the judi-
ciary compensates the trucking industry for its losses, the Motor
282. A deduction would reduce taxable income subject to the taxable rate, but would
not compensate the trucking companies for the total cost of the operating rights.
283. H.R. 8148, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
284. See note 88 supra; I.R.C. § 1011.
285. See notes 76 & 271 supra.
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Carrier Act of 1980 treads close to robbery.
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MARY HUDGENS LEECH
286. See text accompanying note 233 supra.
